Introduction

1
In this paper, we ∧ analyse how tolerance, which we define as 2 a generic ability to accept diversity, is affected by wealth distri- E-mail addresses: roy.cerqueti@unimc.it (R. Cerqueti), correani@unitus.it (L. Correani), garofalo@unitus.it (G. Garofalo).
of theoretical economic models about the determinants and social 14 dynamics of tolerance. To the best of our knowledge, one of the 15 first theoretical papers on this topic is Corneo and Jeanne (2009).
16
The authors propose a theory of tolerance using the approach of Intolerance is a persistent attitude and its control requires con- is if cultural integration between the two groups is reinforced.
50
These theoretical results suggest that cultural integration should 51 precede economic integration.
52
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follow.
53
Section 2 describes the model and discusses the main results. 
Let us suppose that agents interact after being randomly 74 matched, obtaining payoffs constant in time according to Table 1 . 
79
The interaction between agents of different groups is more com- 1 However, an agent who is highly intolerant of others may partner with an agent that she is intolerant of, but we assume that the relationship will be strained and less fruitful than a more amicable partnership: also in this case we assume that each agent gains 0 (see Muldoon et al., 2011 (1) The parameter β ≥ 0 may be viewed as a measure of intol-17 erants' 'fundamentalism'; when β is high, intolerant agents are 18 strongly adverse to the members of the other group and the in-19 dividual social costs deriving by mixed interaction are high.
20
Let P x i x j the probability that a tolerant agent of group i interacts 21 with a tolerant agent of group j, P x ixj the probability that a toler- with a tolerant member of group j and Px ixj the probability that an 25 intolerant of group i meets an intolerant of group j. We obtain the 26 following probabilities:
Now, in order to provide more intuitive insights into the dynam-
36
ics of tolerance, we will give an explicit shape of the cost function, 37 supposing that:
Given the above probabilities the expected payoffs of tolerant and 41 intolerant individuals in group i are, respectively:
45
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i ̸ = j.
46
To study the evolutionary dynamics of tolerance we will use the theory of replicators (Weibull, 1998 
54
By repeating the same procedure for group 2, we can obtain a sec-55 ond differential equation that, along with Eq. (6), produces a sys-56 tem of two differential equations giving a complete description of 57 tolerance dynamics:
59
The dynamics is assumed to start at an initial state
By applying Eq. (6), we have that the trajectories described in 61 (7) are always into the phase plane:
for every starting point
 ∈ F and time t ≥ 0.
64
By solving (7), we derive the steady states of the dynamical 65 system set on the boundaries of the phase plane F : 
72
The steady states have a precise economic and social meaning.
73
Points P 1 and P 2 depict situations where one group (respectively 74 group 1 and group 2) is wholly populated by intolerant agents. both social groups. The point P 3 is of particular interest for our pur-81 pose being such a steady state related to the case of full tolerance.
82
We will focus ∧ our attention on it.
83
3 Isokine curves are obtained by imposing
with x 1 ∈ (0, 1) and x 2 ∈ (0, 1). 
The following facts will turn out to be useful: 
that is distributed between them and then consumed.
12
The produced wealth depends on the (physical and human) capital and given that R 12 = R 21 ≡ R 2 payoffs become:
25
where Furthermore, from (10) it is easy to show that:
38 from which we derive the following results:
39
Corollary to Proposition 1. 
that is 1/2 < Γ 1 < δ 1 < Γ 2 < 1, where
Proof. ≈ 1, we obtain the following levels of welfare: 
